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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
ROBERT ALLEN LEE, individually 
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- against ­
- - - -x 
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OPINION & ORDER 

STACEY MAKHNEVICH and ASTER DENTAL, 
a/kJa CHRYSLER BUILDING DENTAL 
ASSOCIATION, aJkJa NORTH EAST P.C., aJkJa 
SOUTH EAST DENTAL SUIT, aJkJa LINCOLN 
SQUARE DENTAL ARTS, aJkJa LINCOLN 
SQUARE DENTAL ARTS OF MANHATTAN, 
aJkJa CHRYSLER DENTAL, 
Defendants. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x 
HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, Uni ted States District Judge: 
This lawsuit about a toothache and a denti st's attempt to insulate herself from criticism 
by patients has tumed into a headache. After appealing to his dentist for pain relief, Plaintiff 
Robert Allen Lee, ironically. is appealing to the court for relie f from his denti st. The Defendants 
are New York dentist Stacey Makhnevich and her practice Aster Dental. Defendants would not 
treat any patients unless they signed a confidentiality agreement as a precondition to treatmenl. 
The agreement purports to assign (0 Defendants a copyright over any comments creared or made 
by patients about Defendants. 
Lee seeks a declaration that Derendants ' confidentiality agreement is vo id for lack of 
consideration and is unconsc ionable under New York common law, and further constitutes a 
deceptive practice in violation of Section 349(et) of the New York General Business Law. 
(Claims Three, Four, and Fi ve.) Alternatively, Lee seeks a declaration that patient commentS 
constitute a protected fair use under Section 107 of the Copyright Act, and that the class is 
entitled to equitable defenses. (Claims One and Two.) Tn addition, Lee seeks on his own behalf 
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a declaration that his comments were not defamatory because they were truthful, a declaration 
that his postings constituted fai r use, and seeks damages for breach of contract for Defendants ' 
failure to submit Lee's claim to his insurance company. (Claims Six, Seven and Eight.) 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jUJisd iction and failure to 
state a claim pursuant to Fed . R. e iv. P. Rule J2(b)(J) and 12(b){6) . For the reasons set fo rth 
below, Defendants' mot ions to dism iss pu rsuant to both Rule 12(b)(I) and 12(b)(6) are denied. 
BACKGROUNO 
In late October 2010, Lee experienced severe toothache pain. (CampI. ~ 16.) Lee chose 
Aster Dental because hi s insurance company listed them as preferred providers. (llL) The 
Defendants told Lee that he would have to pay Defendants directly and that Defendants would 
then submit Lee's paperwork 10 his insurer for reimbursement. CllL 17 .) Defendants also 
required Lee, as with all patients, to sign a confidentiality agreement entitl ed "Mutual Agreement 
to Maintain Pri vacy" before providing treatment, regardless of the severity of their condition. 
(ld. '1'12, 18 .) Lee was in severe pain; and he signed the agreement in the hope of relief. (ld·'1 
20) 
The agreement precludes patients from post ing comments about Defendants and assigns 
to Defendants all copyrights in those comments. It provides, in relevant part: 
"Tn consideration for treatment .. . Patient agrees to refrain from directly o{ indirectly 
publishing ... conunentary upon Dent ist and his practice, expertise andlor treatment ... 
If Patient does prepare commentary for publicat ion about Dentist , the Patient exclusiv ely 
assigns all [ntellectual Property rights, including copyrights, to Dentist for any written, 
pictorial, and/or electronic commentary .. .. This agreement shall be operative and 
etTeclive at the time of creation (prior to publication) of the commentary .... In addition, 
Patient will not denigrate. defame, di sparage, or cast aspersioos upon the Dentist; and. 
will use all reasonable efforts to prevent any member ortheir immediate fam ily or 
acquaintance from engaging in any such activity." 
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(CampI. Ex. A ~ 3). In return for this restraint 011 speech, Defendants made the disturbing 
promise not 10 do exactly whalthey are not supposed to do in the first instance. Defendants 
promised not to exploit loopholes in HIPPA that Defendants asserted allow them to pass along 
Lee's palient information to third party marketers. (ld. ~ 2.) 
Only after Lee signed this agreement did Dr. Makhnevich proceed to treat Lee's infected , 
painful tooth. lliL' 21 .) Lee was billed nearly $4,800 for his troubles and paid Ihis amount. 
((d . 'l~ 21-22.) Despite Lee 's numerous telephone cal ls, Defendants never forwarded Lee's 
paperwork to his insurer fo r reimbursem ent. (llL ~ 23). When Lee requested a copy ofllis dental 
records to submit the claim himself, Defendants refused to provide them , bu t instead referred 
him to a third party U1at demanded a $200 charge. CllL ~ 24). 
On August 24, 20 11, Lee recounted hi s experience at Aster Denta l on several websites, 
including Yelp and DoctorBase. (Id. ' 126). Lee's comments critic ized Defendrmts for 
overcharging him, refusing to submit his insurance claim, and re fusing to provide him with his 
dental records. ([d. Ex. B.) rmmediatel y thereafter on August 25, 2011, Defendants sent a letter 
to Lee threatening him with an action for breach of contract , defamation , and copyright 
infringement. (CampI. ~ 27). The Jelter stated that Defendants would seek $100,000 in damages 
and attached a draft or tile complaint Ihat they intended to file. (Id . Ex. D.) The letter wa rned 
that "[tJhis Jetter shall serve you as the only notice prior to litigation." (Id.) In the draft 
complaint, entitled Notice of Commencement of Legal Actions, Defendants claimed they were 
"damaged thereby in the sum 0($85 ,000 plus in terest" and a lso sought "525,000 general 
damages for . . . fraud ." QQ...) On Septemher 12 and October 5, 20 ) L Defendants issued 
invoices to Lee, charging him $ 100 per day for copyright infringement. (Compl. '129). The 
invoices provided that "[a]ccounts not paid within 7 days of an in vo ice are subject to a \.5% late 
3 

Case 1:11-cv-08665-PAC   Document 25    Filed 03/27/13   Page 3 of 10
charge fee and a service charge 0[$20." (Ex. F.) On October 24, 2011, l ee received another 
letter threatening litigation, this time from Defendants' atto rney, stating that "all legal possible 
actions will be taken against you in which you will be responsible for any judgment made against 
YOu." (CompJ. 11 30; Ex . G.) 
Tn September 2011, Defendants continued the ir aggressive and threatening conduct. 
They sent takedown notices to the web sites where Lee had made comments about Defendants. 
(Campi. 'if 28; Ex. E.) The letters stated that the Digital Millennium Copyright Acl ("DMCA") 
provided a safe harbor to lnlemet Service Providers ("JSPs") who "expeditiously remove 
unauthori zed posting[ sJ of copyrighted material Ollce notified." (l!L Ex . E.) The takedown 
noli ce wamed thaI if the websites did not remove the commentary immediately, however, they 
wou ld Jose the DMCA 's protection and Defendants would "consider coordinating with counsel 
to implement any and ail remedies allowable by Jaw." (CampI. ~ 28; Ex. E.) 
DISCUSSION 
1. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) 
In resol ving a motion 10 dismiss a case for lack ofsubjecl matter jurisdiction, the COlin must 
accept as Irue all factual allegations ml:lde in the complaint and draw all inferences in the light 
most favorable 10 the plaintiff. Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court is 
not limited 10 Ihe face of the complainl and ma y consider evidence o utside the pJeadings. Phifer 
v. New York , 289 F.3d 49,55 (2d Cir. 2002). A plainliffmust prove jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id . 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, does not provide a federal court with 
subject mailer jurisdiction, but merely expands the spectrum of re li ef and remedies a federal 
com1 may grant; an independent basis for jurisdiction must fi rst exist before relief may be 
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granted under 28 U.S.c. § 220 1. Garan t; Finansal Kiralama A.S. v. Aqua Marine and Trading 
I..n c., 679 F.3d 59, 66 (2d e ir. 20 t 2). Federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over 
copyright in fringement actions based on 28 U.S.C. § t 33 1, which co nfers federal question 
j urisd iction , and 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which confers o ri ginal, exclusive jurisdiction over copyright 
claims. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154,1 30 S. CL 1237, 1246 (20 10). Lee 
brings hi s cla ims for a declaration of copyright non-infr ingement under the Copyright Act, 17 
u.S.c. §§ 101 et ~ . Specifically, Lee asks the Co urt to apply the fair use provisions of the 
Copyright Act, 17 U. S.c. § 107, and fo r a declaration relat ing to copyright ownershi p- claims 
that ari se under the Copyright Act. Accordingly, the Court is satisfi ed that it has an independent 
basis of juri sdiction over these copyrigh t cla ims. \ As the Co un wi II d iscuss be low, in add ition, 
Lee has properl y asserted diversit y jurisdiction under 28 U. S.c. § 1332 over aU claims and 
supplemental j uri sd iction under 28 U.S.c. § 1367 over the remaining state law claims. 
A. Actu a l Case or Controversy 
Art icle III of the Constit ution and the Declaratory Judgment Act impose the addi tiona l 
j uri sdictional requirement of an ac tual controversy. See Nikc , Inc. v. Al ready, LLC, 663 F.3d 
89, 9S (2d eir. 201 1). The Act provides that "[i] n a case of actual controversy," a federal court 
"may dec lare the ri ghts .. . of any interested part y seeking such declaration." 28 U.S.c. § 
220 l(a). The Second Circuit applies a totality-or-the-circumstances test 10 determi ne a 
j usticiable controversy in intellectual property cases. See Nike, 663 F .3d at 9S (citing 
Medlrnmune. Inc . v. Geneniech, Inc., 549 U.S. 11 8, 126- 27 (2007)) . Under this test , the COllt1 'S 
tusk is to consider whether "the adversity oflegal interests that ex ists between the parties is real 
I De fendants concede that Secuon 411 (a) of \he Copyright Act does not present a jurisdictional bar to Lee's causes 
of aclion. Indeed, Section 41 1 (a)'5 registration requirement is a precondi tion 10 fil ing sui t that docs nOI restTicl a 
coun ' s subject mauer j urisdicti on . Reed Elsev ier v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 , 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1247 (20 10). 
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and substantia l and admits of specific reliefthrough a decree ora conclusive character, as 
distinguished fro m an opinion advising what tne law would be on a hypotheti cal stale of facts." 
ld . at 95-96 (citing Medlmmune, 549 U.S . at 127) ( internal qllotatio n marks and alterations 
omitted); Telebrands Com. v, Exceptional Prods., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXfS 139308, at *5 (D.N.J. 
Dec. 5, 2011 ) ("[T]he Court mLlst decide 'whether the facts alleged , under a ll the c ircumstances, 
show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy and rea lity to warrant the issuance o f a declaratory judgmenl. '" (quo ting 
Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 127)). 
Defendants' argument that no actual controversy ex ist s is specious. Defendants created 
the controversy with Lee by attempting to enforce the agreement, which they extracted as a 
condition for gelling dental treatment. Further, under the totality of circumstances , the 
controversy is su rticiently "real" and " im.mediate." Defendunls cannot pretend now that their 
notices to Lee were "just kidding," or that Lee lacked any reasonable ap prehensio n of li nb iliiy. Z 
A brie f review o f Defendants' conduct in response to Lee' s exercise of bas ic right s shows how 
ridicu lous their arguments are: (1) Defendants twice threatened Lee with suit, the second 
not ification being from an anomey who did not speci fy a dead line by which suit would 
commence; (2) Defendants prepared and senl a dra ft version of the complain t Ihey would fil e in a 
New York state court (Ex . D); and (3) Defendants sent (wo invoices, one which threatened 
refe rral to a collection agency. C r. Telebrands, 2011 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 139308, at *6 (finding 
that Defendants ' communications to Plaintiff notifying them of potential causes of action 
While Lee re lies on Ihe reasonable apprehension leSt, Med lmmunc d isavow(u th:lI lesl and lowc red the 

Jequirement for a showing of atl actual conlroversy. Ni!.;e, 663 F.3d al 95-96; Telebrallds, 20 II U.S. f)isl. LEXI S 

' 39308. at ·6 0.2. Eve'. under the older lest, however, Lee has alleged su fficient fa cts to show a reilsonable 

apprehcllsion of liability. ID Cosa Instrument Corp v. Hobre Instruments PV, 698 F. Supp. 2d 345, 346-47, 349 

(E.D.N.Y . 20 10) (finding a reasonable allprehenslon where defendant ,HId counsel sent two )(tte rs thai 

commu,licated their inlent to bring an infril"lgemenl SU it for plaintiffs' continued sale o f ils producll . 
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adequately showed an immediate and real controversy}. No reasonable person could view 
Defendants ' constant balTage o f threats as anything other than a real controversy. 
Further, Defendants have not rel eased Lee from liability fo r the amount threatened in the 
draft complaint, which is in excess of$J lO,OOO, or the amount charged by the two invoices. 
There is an objectivel y supported threat of future il1jury- which Defendants ' conduct as created. 
In light o f Defendants ' threats of liabil ity, Lee is not required to await Defendants' initiation of 
an action to sen Ie this actual controversy. Medlmmune, 549 U.S. at 134. 
B. Diversity of Citizenship 
The Court has detennined that it has jurisdiction over the coPYlight claims, and there is 
no basis for dismissing them pursuant to Rule 12(h)(6). The complainl' s remaining state law 
claims are related 10 the copyright claims; they ari se from the same incidents invo lving Lee' s 
visit to the dentist, his execution orthe agreement, and his suhsequent internet postings. See 
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 3 13 FJd 713 , 723 (2d Cir. 2002) ( fi nd ing thaI state claims were 
sufficiently related when they arose "out of ap proximately the same sel o f events as .. . federal . 
. claim[ s]."). Thus the court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, and there is no 
basis to decline to exercise that jurisdiction pursuan t to the factors contained in I 367(c}(l)·(4}. 
See Har-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russ ian Kurier, [nc., 140 F.3d 442, 447 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Independently, Lee has properl y invoked the Court 's diversity jurisdiction over aU claims 
under 28 U.S.c. § 1332(a). As the parties are from different states, the only remaining quest ion 
is whether the jurisdictional amount of $75,000 has been satisfi ed. (Compl. ~ 13.) Courts 
presume that the amount alleged on the face of the complaint is the actual amount in controversy. 
Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc 'y of U.S., 347 FJd 394, 397 (2d Ci r. 2003). This 
presumption may be rebutted only by showing "to a legal certainly that the amount reco verable 
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does not meet the jurisdictional threshold." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). " Tn actions 
seeking declaratory or injunctive rclief, it is well established lhallhe amount in controversy is 

measured by the value orthe object of the litigation." Hunt v, Wash. Stale Apple Adver. 

Comm' n, 432 U.S. 333 , 347 (1977). That is to say, courts may consider Ihe va lue of the inju ry 

being averted in delennining whether the amount in co nlroversy has been met. Beueon Constr. 

Co. v. Mateo Elec. Co., 52 1 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975); ~ Docto r's Assocs. v. Hamilton, 150 

F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d eir. 1998).3 This amount is calculated from Ihe plaintiffs viewpoi nt. 

Kheel v. Port o f New York Auth ., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Ci r. 1972). 

Defendants argue that from Lee's standpoint, Lee 's only requested damages are 
$4,766.00 for breach o f contract. That is wishfullhinking. The complaint values the injury at 
approximatel y $100,000, based on Defendants' own conduct in threatening litigati on against 
Lee. Defendants' demand Jetter and draft complaint, and their own conduct to enforce the 
agreement they extracted befo re Lee was treated have created the situation in which Lee finds 
himself. Defendants cannot walk away from the jurisdictional amou nt, $75,000, by arguing that 
their $ 1 00,000 threats were meaningl ess. Indeed, accepting the value which De fendants placed 
on thei r threats, Lee has made an adequate showing that he meets the amo unt-in-controversy 
threshold. 
II. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule l2(b)(6) 
When considering a motion to dismiss fo r failure 10 state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), the Court "must accepl as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint" 
Accord Alli. St:lndard, Inc . v. Qakfa bco, Inc. 498 f . Supp. 2d 711 , 717 (S.D. N.Y. 2007) (" (T]hc vallie o f the 
requested relief i!; Ihe mOJletary va.lue of the benefit that would Oow to the plaintiff if injunCTi ve o r dec1:::JralOf)' relid 
were granted."): Hough v.l\·lerrill Lvnch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 757 f. Supp. 283, 286 (S.D .N.Y. 199 1), 
arrd 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. (99 1) ("' In this action to vacate the arbitration award The amount III controvers y maybe 
regarded as either !.he value to plaintitT o f the re lief sought or the loss to defenda\ll if the relief i ~ granted .'"). 
8 

l 
Case 1:11-cv-08665-PAC   Document 25    Filed 03/27/13   Page 8 of 10
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff Bell All. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court only 
"assessles] the legal feasibility of the complaint"; it does not "assay the weig.ht of the evidence 
which might be offered in support thereof. " Lopez v. Jet Blue Airways, 662 F.3d 593, 596 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (i nternal quotation marks omitted). To state a faci ally plausible claim, a plainliffmust 
plead "factual content th ai allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
li able fo r the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading 
that offers ' labels and conclusions' or 'a fonnulaic recitation oflhe elements of a cause of ac tion 
will not do.' '' 
The parties agree that Defendants' failure to comply with 17 U.S.c. § 411(a)'s 
registration requirement does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction in copYTight actions. See 
Reed Elsevier, 130 S.Ct. at 1247. Instead, the parties' disagreement is over whether registration 
must be pled to survive dismissal in a declaratory action [or non-infringement under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that Lee's declaratory claims involving the Copyright Act fai I 
to state a claim for relief because Defendants' purpolted copyrights were never registered. 
Section 17 U.S.C. 411 (a) provides that "no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any 
United States work shall be in stituted until preregistration or registration of the copYTighl claim 
has been made." But tlH'II is not what plainti ff seeks. He is seeking rel ief from Defendants' 
assert ion Ihat Lee's comments about Defendants' hard ly defensible practices are suhject to 
copYIight protection. Defendants' argument that the COPYTigh l must be registered before relief 
can he granted to Plaintiff turns the law upsidedown. 
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Ill, Defendants' Referen ces to Class Members Other than Lee 
Wh ile Defendants make much of the supposed failu re o f un identi fi ed class members 10 
satisfy Art icle mand the Dec laratory Judgment Act's justiciability requirement, the issue is not 
germane at this time. At the pre-motion con ference on March 5, 20 12, the COllrt infonned the 
part ies that discussion of the propriety of cert ifyi ng a class wou ld be premature, and instructed 
the parties to file their motions to dismiss without analyz.ing the class action. Accordingly, the 
Court' s orde r here is specific to the abiJit y o f Lee to assert his claims. Defendants may renew 
their object ions challenging the class' claims at the class certification stage. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) and 
12(b )(6) in their entirely. The Court has originalj uri sdiction over the claims arising under the 
Copyright Act (Claims One, Two, and Seven) , supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
claims (Tlu'ee, Four, Five, Six and Eight), and diversil y jurisdiction over all cla ims. Since the 
fai lu re to register is not di sposi tive in a declaratory ac ti on for non-i nfri ngement, Defendanls' 
motion to dismiss the copyright claims is denied. The Clerk o rthe COllrt is directed to tenninate 
the motions al docket nos. 18 and 20. The parties are ordered to submit a civil case management 
plan 10 the COllrt by April 26, 2013. 
Dated: New York, New York 
March 27, 20 13 
PA 
United States District Judge 
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